JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. properties of an important class of economic quantities, which includes "income" (see [15], [17]). On the other hand, we think that the tools which we shall use are as important as the results which we hope to achieve: that is, we intend to draw the economist's attention to the great potentital importance of "stable non-Gaussian" probability distributions. To give a sharper focus to our paper, we shall develop our main points within the frame of a theory of income distribution;
properties of an important class of economic quantities, which includes "income" (see [15] , [17] ). On the other hand, we think that the tools which we shall use are as important as the results which we hope to achieve: that is, we intend to draw the economist's attention to the great potentital importance of "stable non-Gaussian" probability distributions. To give a sharper focus to our paper, we shall develop our main points within the frame of a theory of income distribution;
but our approach will be immediately translatable in terms of similar quantities, and our theory may well be more reasonable, or the empirical fit better, in the case of some other quantities. We may thus paraphrase what a famous author said of Brownian motion: it is possible that the properties which we shall study are identical to those of income;
however, the information available to us regarding incomes is so lacking in precision that we cannot really form a judgment on the matter. This paper will be almost exclusively theoretical. Our point of departure will be an interesting empirical observation, namely, that over a certain range of values of income U, its distribution is not markedly influenced either by the socio-economic structure of the community under study, or by the definition chosen for "income." That is, these two elements may at most influence the values taken by certain parameters of an apparently universal distribution law. This law was discovered by V. Pareto in 1897 [24] ; actually, several different statements have at times been called "Pareto's law." In the introduction we shall very carefully distinguish between these statements, and we shall comment upon some existing theories of income distribution.
We shall then introduce a new version of Pareto's law which belongs to the class of "stable" distributions, and which we shall designate as "the Pareto-Levy lawv" (P-L)c' This law also explains partially the data relative to the middle-income range.
The initial motivation for this law will be essentially twofold. First, among all the possible interpolations of the weak (asymptotic) Pareto law, the P-L law is the only one which strictly satisfies one (strong)
form of the condition of invariance oi the distribution, relative to the definition of income. Second, a P-L distribution is a possible linmit distribution of sums of random variables. That is, as we shall demonstrate, the Gaussian distribution is not the only possible such limit (as is too generally assumed), and it is unnecessary (as well as insufficient) to try to save the limit argument by applying it to log U, instead of U, as is done in some theories leading to the "log-normal law" for U.
The P-L law turns out to have many other very desirable properties. it has also the drawback that it is limited to the interpolation of Pareto's law, when its index a is such that 1 < a < 2, (see 1.1 for a definition of a).
In a series of other articles, which has started with [18] , [19] , [20] ,
we also study the IP-L stochastic processes, a family of models of income variation. These processes agairn preserve certain desirable properties of the classical Gaussian processes without such drastic defects as the fact that income variation cannot possibly be Gaussian.
It turns out that in the high income range, a P-L Markovian process can be approximated by a randonm walk of log U: that is, we are able to derive the fundarnental initial assumptions of a model due to Champernowne [2] . Moreover, a P-L Markovian process behaves quite reasonably in the intermediate range of incomes. 1P when u < u.
Then, the "density" p(u) = -dP(u)/du satisfies I a(u 0)u-(a+l when u > u?
O(U) = 0 when u < ul.
This distribution is fully specified by two "state variables": u0, a scale factor, and a, which will turn out to be some kind of index of inequality of distribution. The strong law leaves the value of a undetermined (although in some cases, one immediately states that a > 1).
We may also find the stronger statement that a -_ 3/2: the corresponding variant of the strong law will be referred to as the strongest Pareto law. Graphically, the strong law implies that the ("double logarithmic") graph of y log P, as a function of v -log t, is a straight line.
The empirically observed P(u) are of course percentages relative to finite populations. They will further be considered as frequencies relative to a random sample, drawn from an infinite population. [Empirically, the law holds as well for samples of a few hundred (the "burghers" of a city-state of the Renaissance) or of close to a hundred million (the taxpayers in the USA).] That is, U will be treated as a random variable with values u, and the curve describing the variation of U in timne will be treated as a random function. Graphically, this means that the curve (log P, log u) is asymptotic to the straight line which represents the strong Pareto law.
1.3. Interpolation of the weak Pareto law. The range of values of u which is accounted for by Pareto's analytic expression cove:s only a part of the total population. Elsewhere the "density" -dP(u)/du is represented by a quite irregular curve, the shape of which depends in particular upon the breadth of coverage of the data considered.
This has been particularly clearly emphasized by H. P. Miller [22] .
He has shown that the income distribution is skewed and presents several maxima, if one includes all individuals, even those with no income and part-time workers, and if one combines the incomes of men and women. However, the separate income distributions oI most of the different occupational categories, as distinguished by the census, are both regular and fairly symmetric; the main source of skewness in the overall distribution and hence in Pareto's law can be traced to the inclusion of self-employed persons and managers together with all wage earners. One may also note that the method of reporting income differs by occupational categories, and that, as a result, the corresponding data are not equally reliable.
The above reasons make it unlikely that a single theory could ever explain all the features of the income distribution or that a single empirical formula could ever represent all the data. As a result, it has been frequently suggested that several different models may be required to explain the empirical P(u); unfortunately, we know of no empirical check of this conjecture. In any case, the present paper will be devoted almost exclusively to a theory of high income data and of the weak Pareto law. It is unlikely that the interpolation of the results of our model will be able to explain finally all the middle income data. However, we shall not examine this point in great detail. B. The best known statement about income distribution, apart from the weak Pareto law, is the log-normal law [8], [1] , which claims that the variable log U [or perhaps better log (U-u'), where u'>0] is well represented by the Gaussian distribution. The empirical evidence for this is that the graph of (P, u) on log-normal paper seems to be straight.
Such a graph emphasizes a different range of values of u from that of the Pareto graph, so that the graphical evidence for the two laws is not contradictory. The motivation for the log-normal law is, however, largely theoretical (see 1.5). Roughly speaking, a log-normal U can be explained by assuming that log U is the sum of many additive components.
1.5. Some existing models of income distribution considered as "thermodynamic" theories. There is a great temptation to consider the exchanges of money which occur in economic interaction as analogous to the exchanges of energy which occur in physical shocks between gas molecules. In the loosest possible terms, both kinds of interactions 6"should" lead to "similar" states of equilibrium. That is, one "should" be able to explain the law of income distribution by a model similar to that used in statistical thermodynamics: many authors have done so explicitly, and all the others of whom we know have done so implicitly.
Unfortunately, the Pareto P(u) decreases much more slowly than any of the usual laws of physics, so that if one wants to apply the physical theory mechanically, one must somehow argud that U is a less intrinsic variable than some slowly increasing function V(U). For that, one must renounce the additive properties of U. The seemingly universal choice for V is V = log U [or V' r log (U -u')]. This choice is suggested by the fact that one plots log<u empirically. But it can also be traced back to the "moral wealth" of Berpouilli, and it apparently can be justified by some law of proportionate effect, or by some kind of Weber-Fechner law. If this choice of V is granted, one has to explain the normal law for the middle zone of v's, and the exponential law P(v) = exp {-a(v -v0)} for the upper zone of v's.
Indeed, many existing models of the Pareto distribution are reducible to the observation that (for any a) exp (-av) is a possible barometric density distribution in the atmosphere. Alternatively, con-sider a set of Brownian particles, floating in a gas at a uniform temperature and density, the whole being enclosed in a semi-infinite tube with a closed bottom and an open top; assume further that the field of gravity is uniform. Then the density distribution which the Brownian particles attain as a state of final equilibrium is the exponential. This is the result of a compromise between two forces, both uniform along the tube, i.e., the force of gravity, which alone would tend to pull all particles to the bottom, and the influence of heat motion, which alone would tend to diffuse them all to infinity. Clearly, the models of income distribution we are now considering involve an interpretation of the forces of diffusion and of gravity.
Unfortunately, such interpretations are never sufficiently intuitive to exclude, for example, the removal of the counterpart of the bottom of the tube. The trouble is that such a removal changes everything. In fact, there is no steady limit state any longer, because all the Brownian particles diffuse to ininus infinity. It is true that the is a function only of V(t) and of chance, and (2) that the probability that V(t + 1) -v(t) = kv'" becomes independent of v(t) as v increases.
Additional assumptions are required to get either Pareto's law or the log-normal law, and the difference between these additional assumptions has no intuitive meaning, which makes both conclusions unconvincing. However, the models which lead to the exponential are still slightly better: in fact, we can, perhaps, argue that the apparent normality of the "density" p(v) in the central zone of v's simply means that -logp(v) may be represented by a parabola in that zone, whereas for large v's, it is represented by a straight line. Such a parabolic interpolation needs no limit theorems of probability for its justification; it applies to any regularly concave curve, at least in the first approximation.
In the case of models of the weak Pareto law, further non-intuitive assumptions are necessary to rationalize the empirical fact that a > 1 in all cases. We shall be successful only in the case where 1 < a < 2, a restriction which we shall discuss repeatedly.
2. PARETO-LEVY RANDOM VARIABLES 2.
1. An analysis of the definition of income. One of the principal claims of this paper is that it is impossible to "explain" why Pareto's law, and not some other law, is satisfied by income distributions, without also studying the inseparable problem raised by the fact that essentially the same law continues to be Jollowed by the distribution Of "income," despite changes in the def,inition of this term. Such an invariance is of course very important to census analyzers, because of the small effect of large changes in methods of estimating income.
To study this problem one needs a practical way of expressing the different definitions of U. We shall argue that there are several ways of distinguishing different sources of U. Therefore, U may be written in different ways as a sum of elements, such as: A, agricult- 3 We had indenpendently rediscovered this model and had discussed it in the original text of this paper, as submitted on June 19, 1959 . The coincidence of the predictions of the P-L model and of the Lydall model for 1<a <2, shows that the distribution which corresponds to the least amount of organization could be "frozen" without modifying it, reinterpreted as a wage distribution and then let to evolve along conceptually quite different lines. This fact has great relevance to the problem of the value of a and to the fact that a has recently tended to increase beyond 2, in highly organized Under these assumptions, the only probability law for income which could possibly be observed must be such that if U' and U" follow this law (up to a scale transformation, and up to the choice of origin), then U' E U" must also follow the same law (the sign 0D designates the addition of random variables). That is, whatever a'>O, b', a">O, b", there exist two constants a > 0 and b, such that
Such a probability law is said to be "stable" (under addition), and its density as well as the variable U itself are "stable." The family of all laws which satisfy this requirement has been constructed by Paul Levy [10] : it includes, naturally, the Gaussian law, but it also includes certain non-Gaussian laws, each of which turns out to satisfy the weak Pareto law, with some 0 < a < 2. In other words, the additivity property of U, and the behavior of P(u), under the weak Pareto law (both of which disappear if the scale of U is changed) turn out to be precisely sufficient and necessary for the application of Le'vy's theory of stable laws.
Further, the parameters of a non-Gaussian stable law can be arranged so that E(U) < co, which requires 1 < a < 2, and so that p(-u) decreases very much faster than p(u), when u o oo: in the latter case, the stable law may be called positive, an abbreviation for "gmaximally skewed in the positive direction."
Since the usual terminology of probability (stable distributions) does not serve our purpose, we propose to refer to "positive" stable distributions with 1 < a < 2, as "Pareto-Levy distributions."
It is not strictly true that the distribution of income is invariant over the whole range of u, with respect to a change in definition of income. We argue, however, that if the variable U is not Gaussian and is very skewed, the most reasonable "first order" assumption about income is that it is a P-L variable.
The density p(u) of the P-L law unfortunately cannot be expressed in a closed analytic formi, but is determined by its bilateral Laplace transform (valid for b > 0):
which depends upon three parameters: a (1 < a < 2), u* (which is a positive scale parameter), a-nd 111 (which is identical to E(U)).
G(b) yields the result:
where F(1 -a) is the Euler gamma-function.
For other values of u, the Pareto-Levy distribution had to be computed. A few sample graphs of densities appear in Figure 1 . More detailed tables will be published by Mandelbrot and Zarufaller [21] .
We see that as long as a is not close to 2, the P-L density curve very rapidly becomes indistinguishable from a strong Pareto curve of the same a. [For this, the origin of the strong Pareto curve must be chosen properly and one must have u uX*F(1 -a).] The two curves converge n-ear u = E(U), when a is in the neighborhood of 3/2, and at even smaller values of u, when a is less than 3/2: that is, the asymptotic behavior of P(u), derived from G(b), is very rapidly implemented. As for large negative values of u, by the P-L law they have a probability which is not zero, but decreases so rapidly as ui co, that they may be safely disregarded; one finds that log log p(u)]>-a log I uI e a-1 This is a faster decrease than in the case of the Gaussian density- Finally, near E(U) and the most likely value of U, the P--L curve has the kind of skewness which one finds in the empirical data and which one hopes to derive in a theoretical curve.
Let a now approach 2. At the limit, the P-L density will tend toward a Gaussian density. Close to the limit, the P-L density already resembles a Gaussian one. Only for large values of u, (which have a very small probability) is the Gaussian decrease of P(u) replaced by a Paretian decrease.
In other terms, the P-L density is worth considering only if a is not "too close" to 2. Even in this range, however, the prediction for intermediate values of u is quite inadequate to cover the complete curve of incomes, as described for example by Miller [22] . But as part-time and unskilled workers are eliminated we more nearly approximate such a curve. On the other hand, the income distribution of unskilled workers is fairly symmetric and has a fairly small dispersion.' Since the distribution of unskilled wages differs from that of high incomes, the P-L law would a priori explain only the latter incomes. If we examine any income category as defined by the Bureau of Census, we can seldom tell in advance whether its income mechanism is closer to that of the unskilled workers or to that of the largest income recipients. Therefore, if we wish to determine how wide are the categories to which the P-L law applies, the only solution is to start from the P-L interpolation of high incomes, and then to see how many other incomes (and which) must be added to obtain a good fit. This establishes a distinction between two kinds of income categories. The reasonableness of this distinction should be checked on independent grounds. For the time being we shall be content to observe that for a far enough from 2 the prediction made by the P-L law is "reasonable." (cf. 2.6.)
We shall conclude this section with a few statements concerning non-P-L stable distributions. The Gaussian distribution is of course stable, and it is the only stable distribution with a finite variance. Further, all the stable variables with a finite mean are differences of P-L variables scaled by arbitrary positive coefficients. The bilateral generating function is no longer defined, and we must consider the usual characteristic function (cof.). For a P-L variable, the c.f. is immediately obtained as
Hence, denoting by (1 + e)/(1 -) the ratio of the positive and negative components, the general stable variable, with E(U) < co, has a c.f. of the form:
= exp[-iMC -Kl(u*)W{1 -tg t7r }cos t]
where u> ?0, 1,8I < I and 1 < a < 2. ( We may note that the same formula, with 0 < a < 1, gives another family of stable variables, with E( U) = oo. The stable variables which do not fall into either of the above families are those of Gauss and of Cauchy and finally a small family of variables connected with those of Cauchy.) 2.2. Another (equivalent) property of the stable laws. The stable laws have another (equivalent) property: they are the only possible limit laws of weighted sums of identical and independent random variables.8 That is, if U is decomposed into a sum of a large number of components Us, we need not resort to the above argument of observational invariance; we know that (1) if the sum is not Gaussian (which is a conspicuous fact), (2) if the expected value of the sum is finite (which is also a fact), and (3) if the probability of -u is much less than that of u, for u > 0 and large, then no hypothesis about the distribution of the parts is necessary to conclude that the sum can only be a Pareto-Levy variable. We shall develop these points in more detail, and in 2.6 we shall show that the above restrictions may be reduced to broad "qualitative" properties, such as 'the likelihood that two independent variables U' and U" contribute unequally to the sum U' 6f U". B Every stable law is such a limit. To prove this, assume that the variables Us themselves are stable; by induction of stability, the e-sum v 1 U8 will be a variable These results may be better than expected because the limit distribution might not hold for U, which is a sum of only a few random components. That is, if one wants to increase the number of components of U, one must abandon the hypothesis of independence at some point:
the more U is subdivided the less independent the components become.
This is a difficulty which is not proper to the problem of income, but is acutely present in all social science applications of probability theory.7
Of course, the principle of the difficulty appears in physics for example in explaining why some kind of noise is Gaussian. But in most physical problems there exists a sufficiently large zone between the systems which are so small that they are impossible to subdivide and those which are so large that they can no longer be considered as homogeneous.
No such zone exists in most problems of economics, so that a seemingly successful application of a limit theorem may seem too good to be true.
To sum up, it cannot be strictly true that the additive components are indepenident and hiave the same distribution (up to scale). However, the "likelihood" of any distribution is greatly increased if this is the only one reducible to limit arguments. Hence, if a sum of many co,mponents is not Gaussian, is skewed, and such that E(U) < o, then the most reasonable first assumiption concerning the sum is that it follows the Pareto-Levy law.
More precisely, two extreme interpretations are possible. The "minimal" interpretation regards the Pareto-Levy distribution as just another law which is correct asymptotically, is sutfficiently easy to handle, and is useful in the first approximation (after all, the Gaussian itself is frequently a good first approximation to distributions which, actually, are certainly not Gaussian).
At the other extreme we may take the Pareto-Le6vy law entirely seriously, and try to check its ability to predict some properties of income distribution which otherwise would seem independent of the weak Pareto law. We think that sucih predictions were in fact achieved.
This provides some claim for a "maximal" interpretation of the P-L law, which regards its invariance and limit properties as being "ex- being exactly what is needed, and a is "near" 3/2. In fact, a should not be too close to 2, and cannot be greater than 2, a point which requires some elaboration. We find that the sign of a -2 distinguishes two sets of different random variables. The occurrence of a > 2, or even a < 2 but close to 2, may mean a predominance of salaries (Lydall's income model [13] is valid for all values of a). (Another explanation may be found in Mandelbrot [19] .) On the other hand, several of the examples where a > 2 are encountered occur in communities of Oceania which are very much less self-contained than, for example, Great Britain or the U.S.A. Their distributions of U may perhaps be truncated. In any case, the sign of a -2 raises an important empirical problem: Is the fit of the weak law equally good regardless of this sign, and does this law represent a higher percentage of the data where a < 2 ? A second consequence of the limitation 1 < a < 2 is that the second moment of U is then infinite, the first moment being finite. This is 2.5. Heuristic study of the addition of tvo independent random variables, particularly in the Gaussian and weak Pareto cases. Let U' and U" be two independent random variables, having the same probability density p(u). We shall compare the behavior of p(u) for large u, and that of p2(u) | p(x)p(u -x)dx, which is the density of the sum U = U'QD U". It will be assumed that u may vary to has the same convexity, up or down, over the whole range of variation of u', so that the expression -log p(x) -log p(u -x) has an extremum for x = u/2. These two cases are illustrated in Figure 2 .
One kind of convexity arises when d2 logp(u)/du2 < 0, for all u.
Then p(u) decreases rapidly as u -co, and the integrand p(x)p(u -x) has a maximum for x = u/2. If that maximum is strong enough, the integral } p(x)p(u -x)dx is likely to be made up to a great extent of the contributions of the x's in a small interval near u/2. Hence, a large value of u is likely to come from two contributions u' and u" which are almost equal. (This is not obvious, and in particular it is not true if the concavity of -log p is turned the other way.)
Consider for example the Gaussian density P(X)= e exp 2x
It is known that P2(U) =exp so that the Gaussian character of density is preserved in addition, except for the value of a. The same result can also be obtained heu- We have in addition proved that the distribution of the largest of two variables U' and U" of the slowly decreasing type has the same asymptotic behavior as the distribution of their sum. Another derivation of this result starts from the derivation of the distribution of max((U', U"). Clearly, Pm(u), the probability that u be larger than max(U', U") is the probability that ut be larger than both u' and u".
Hence,
For large u and small P(u), this becomes
That is, for slowly decreasing densities, Pm(u) P,(u).
A prototype of the slowly decreasing variable is the strong Pareto variable. In that case, we can write: Likewise, any weak Pareto distribution will be invariant in addition up to the value of u?. The proof requires an easy refinement of the previous argument, to cover the case where -logp(x) is not concave or convex all through the range of x, but d2logp(x)/dx2 becomes and stays negative for large values of x (which implies a quite regular behavior for -log p(x) in that region). One can show in this way that the weak Pareto law is preserved in the addition of two (or of a few) independent random variables: there is no self-contradiction in the observed fact that this law holds for parts of income as well as for the whole. That is, the exact definition of the term "income" may not be a matter of great concern. But, conversely, it is unlikely that the observed data on P(u) for large u will be useful in discriminating among several different definitions of "income."
The weak Pareto and the Gaussian are the only laws strictly having the above invariance ("stability") property. They will be distinguished by a criterion of "equality" versus "inequality" between u' and in", when u = u' + u" is known and large. (2.6.) In 2.8 we shall cite a further known result concerning stable probability distributions.
We may also need to know the behavior of p,(u), when the density p'(u') of U' decreases slowly and p"(u") decreases rapidly. In that case, a large u is likely to be equal to u', plus some "small fluctuation."
In particular, a Gaussian error of observation concerning a weak Pareto variable is quite negligible for large u.
2.6. The problem of addition and of division into two, in the case of stable variables. We have shown that the behavior of the sum of two variables is determined mainly by the convexity of -log p(u): we shall later show that this criterion is in general insufficient to study the addition of many variables. However, if we limit ourselves to stable random variables, the convexity of -log p(u') is sufficient to distinguish between the case of the Gaussian and that of all other stable distributions. That is, these two cases may be distinguished by the criterion of approximate equality of the parts of a Gaussian sum contrasted with the great inequality between these parts in the case of all other distributions, in particular the Pareto-Levy one.
This distribution has been used so far only to derive the distribution of U' @ U". Suppose now that the value u of U is given and that we wish to study the distribution of u' or of ui" = u -u'. If the a priori distribution of U' is Gaussian, with mean M and variance a', then the a priori distribution of U is Gaussian with mean 2M and variance 2a2, and the conditional distribution of u', given u, is:
This is Gaussian, with mean value u/2 and variance a2/2. A striking feature of the result is that the law of u' depends on u only through the mean value of U' (see the right-hand side of Figure 2 ).
Let us now consider the non-Gaussian case. Insofar as our theory is adequate in income studies, the problem of division will appear in If the sum u is very large, we find that the distribution of u' has two very sharp maxima, near u'max and u -uma. As u decreases, the shape of this distribution of u' will change, instead of being simply translated, as in the Gaussian case. When u becomes small, more maxima may appear. They will then all merge, and the distribution of u' will differ little from that which is valid in the Gaussian case.
Finally, as u becomes negative and very large, the distribution of u'
will remain one with a single maximum.
Hence, bisection provides a very sharp distinction in this respect between the Gaussian and all other stable laws. Now, consider a fairly small number N; what is the distribution of (1/N)-th of a stable variable? In the Gaussian case this (1/N)-th remains Gaussian, whatever N may be; its mean value is u/N, and its variance (N -1)u2/N. In the non-Gaussian case, each part of a large u may be small or it may be close to u; most of the N parts will be small, but the largest of them will be likely to be close to the whole.
The situation is less intuitive when N becomes very large. However, Levy has proved that the necessary and sufficient condition for the limit of the e-sum E U1 to be Gaussian is that the value us of the largest of the smmnands be negligible compared to the whole.
On the contrary, if the limit is stable non-Gaussian and such that E( U) 0 O, both the sum and the largest of the summands will increase roughly as N,11, and one can even show (Darling [4] ) that their ratio tends towards a limit, which is a random number having a distribution dependent upon a.
Let us now return to the discussion of 2.2. We argued there that U is the sum of N components, without knowing N. A posteriori this turns out to be quite acceptable, because the largest (o; the few largest) of the components will cover a substantial part of the whole, essentially independent of the number N of components. This eminently desirable feature of the P-L theory is an important confirmation of its usefulness.
If, however, a P-L income is small, its components are likely to be of the same order of magnitude as in the Gaussian case. This has an important bearing upon the problem touched near the end of 2.1.
Assume that one has a Census category in which income is usually rather small and which is such that when U is decomposed into parts, the sizes of the parts tend to be proportional to their a priori sizes.
One may assimilate this behavior to that of a Gaussian unskilled worker's income (the decomposition. may now refer to such things as the lengths of time during which parts of income were earned). But such behavior may also be that of a P-L variable, considered for small values of u. As a result, the seemingly fundamental problem of splitting income into two parts so that only one follows the P-L law is bound to have some solutions which are unassailable, but impossible to justify positively. Hence, it is questionable whether this problem is really fundamental. The first limitation is that when a > 1 and hence E(U) < oo this approximation can, at best, be valid if E(U) = 0. This gives the only possible choice of origin of Us such that when N -o co, the distribution of WyN-10 can tend to a limit, over a range of wg such that PN (WN) does not decrease to zero.8
Addition of many weak
The second limitation is that when a> 2, the relationship Pg NP can at best hold in a zone of values wN such that the total probability P-(WN) -0 as N-f oo. This is due to the fact that U now has a finite variance D( U), and it is possible to apply the classical central limit theorem to U. That is, we can now assert that, when N-. oo, Pr { NE(U) < x tends to | exp(-y'/2)dy.
[ like N"'l (that is, more rapidly than Nl""). As a counterpart, the total probability of the values of x, such that P--NP, must tend to zero as N-00o.
Note that the N1'2 diffusion is not radically changed if U is truncated to less than some fixed bound: that is, the N"'l diffusion represents the bahavior of those values of WN which are sums of comparable small contributions, whereas the N""o diffusion represents the behavior of sums of a single large term and of many very small ones.
We can now draw some conclusions concerning the relationship between the behavior of the largest of N terms U, and the bel a 7ior of their sum. In the weak Pareto case, the two problems are identical if N 2, whatever a; but as N increases they become distinct problems. The problem of the maximum is the only one which remains simple and continues to lead to a weak Pareto variable. On the contrary, the concavity of -log p(u') is not a sufficiently stringLent criterion to discriminate between those cases where P-NP does or does not apply, over a range of values of u having a fixed probability. there is an abnormally small number of stars. Moreover, the absence of any stars nea-r 0 is a quite likely event, but alone it can at best give a bounded negative u. Therefore, a large negative u must also contain the negative contributions of stars missing far away from 0; each of these stars contributes little to U, so that the nuinber of missing stars must be very large, and this is very unlikely.
On the contrary, an unboundedly large positive u may be obtained from the presence oI a single star near 0, irrespective of the density of stars elsewhere; such an event is far more likely than the combination of events required for a negative u. It is easy to check the fact that the distribution oi U has the same asymptotic behavior for large u as the distribution of the attraction of the nearest star. International Business Machines Corporation, U. S. A.
APPENDIX I
The behavior of the P-L density for large negative arguments is not classical. To derive it, we note first that the form of the bilateral generating function G(b) (which is not com- For large n, the second and third terms become negligible for all a. The ratio of the coefficients of the first and of the second term depends little upon a; but the ratio of the coefficients of the third and first terms is ruled by r(--a)Ir(--2 a), which is zero for a 3/2, but may become large elsewhere. As a result, the range of values of n over which the third term is important may be large.
Each time a increases past an integral value, the sign of C(1 -e-b) must be changed, and another polynomial term must be added to Z(b), to keep it a generating function.
The number of corrective terms of p2(n) -2p(n) increases, as well as the range of values of n in which the corrective terms are appreciable.
Similarly, as more than two terms are added, pN(n) -Np(n) is vitiated over an increasing range of values of n. Let N -e oo, and observe the weighted sums of the variables Us, whose values are the integers n. (Z remains a summation in the sense of (B.)
For 0 < a < 1, it is sufficient to consider the expression WN =N-" , since its g.f. is ZN(N-1/ab), which tends to exp(-Cbm) when N --* co, as it should.
If 1 < a < 2, one must consider the expression WN = N-Il z ( Ut -M), where M, the mean value of Ut, is easily found to be C. The g.f. of WN is clearly exp(NCb)ZN(N-l Ib) and when N -*0o, it tends to exp (Cbm), as it should. It is easily seen that if we choose for M a value different from C, the g.f. of WN will not tend to a non-degenerate expression.
If the value of a is higher, no linear renorming of Us can eliminate from log[Z(b)] the square term Kb2, and hence, the best normed sum of the Us is the classically normed N-112Z(Ui -M), which tends to a Gaussian, whatever the value of a.
APPENDIX III
This appendix concerns the transformation V=log U, which is used in most classical theories of income distribution.
The strong objections against this transformation do not apply at all in the case of a law due to Estoup and Zipf, which is formally similar to that of Pareto, but relates to word [16] ). In the formal expression of that law U is replaced by the-"rank" of a word, where words are crdered by decreasing frequencies. Hence log U has an intrinsic meaning as "cost of coding"; in particular, the addition of "costs" is quite meaningful.
In the case of income, the transformation V=log U is justified in our [18] and [191, and in a more detailed article which ought to appear soon.
